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THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE MOVES
INTO THE MOVIES
Political turmoil swept the world in the 1930's. One reason for the
turmoil was the competing political propaganda of different nations. Re-
acting to the danger posed by such political propaganda, the United
States Congress enacted the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938
("FARA").' The purpose of FARA was to protect the American public
from the political propaganda of foreign nations. This was to be done by
giving the Department of Justice ("DOJ") the power to censor foreign
films before they could be disseminated to the American public. This
censorship was to take the form of labeling. When the DOJ felt that a
foreign film was political propaganda, it had the power to label the film
as such. Fortunately, the political turmoil, which existed in the 1930's
has come to an end. Thus, the power entrusted to the DOJ has outlived
its welcome.
This casenote demonstrates that the label "propaganda," as used by
the DOJ, is unconstitutional for two reasons. First, it constitutes com-
pelled speech. Second, this is the type of content based censorship,
which is protected by the First Amendment.
Before proceeding to discuss the constitutionality of FARA some of
its requirements must be mentioned. FARA requires agents of a foreign
principal, transmitting "political propaganda" to the American public, to
be registered with the DOJ.2 Before disseminating any film such agents
1. 22 U.S.C.A. § 601 (West 1979).
2. 22 U.S.C.A. § 612 (West 1979) provides in part:
(a) No person shall act as an agent of a foreign principal unless he has filed with the
Attorney General a true and complete registration statement and supplements
thereto as required by subsection (a) and (b) of this section or unless he is exempt
from registration under the provisions of the subchapter ....
(1) Registrant's name, principal business address, and all other business ad-
dresses in the United States or elsewhere, and all residence addresses, if any;
(2) Status of the registrant; ...
(3) A comprehensive statement of the nature of registrant's business: a com-
plete list of registrant's employees and a statement of the nature of the work of each;
the name and address of every foreign principal for whom the registrant is acting,
assuming or purporting to act or has agreed to act; ...
(4) Copies of each written agreement and the terms and conditions of each oral
agreement, including all modifications of such agreements, or, where no contract
exists, a full statement of all the circumstances, by reason of which the registrant is
an agent of a foreign principal; . ..
(5) The nature and amount of contributions, income, money, or thing of value,
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must first register the publication or film with the DOJ.3 The DOJ then
reviews the films to determine whether or not they are propaganda. If
the DOJ concludes that they are propaganda it labels the films accord-
ingly. The label "propaganda" must appear at the beginning of every
publication or showing and must bear the name of the person(s) supply-
ing the publication or film.4 In the case of films, a piece of film must be
added to the beginning of the films which indicates that the DOJ has
labeled this film propaganda.
The constitutionality of FARA was recently challenged in Meese v.
Keene.5 Barry Keene, a member of the California State Senate, wished to
exhibit three Canadian films which dealt with nuclear war and acid rain,
espousing his views on these topics. The films, however, had been la-
beled political propaganda by the DOJ pursuant to FARA. Due to the
public nature of his position, and the importance of his reputation for
maintaining that position, Keene did not want to be publicly regarded as
if any, that the registrant has received within the preceeding sixty days from each
such foreign principal.... ;
(6) A detailed statement of every activity which the registrant is performing
(7) The name, business, and residence addresses, and if an individual, the na-
tionality, of any person other than a foreign principal for whom the registrant is
acting, assuming or purporting to act or has agreed to act under such circumstances
as require his registration hereunder[.]
Id.
3. 22 U.S.C.A. § 614(a) (West 1979) provides:
Every person within the United States who is an agent of a foreign principal and
required to register under the provisions of this subchapter and who transmits ... in
the United States ... any political propaganda for or in the interests of such foreign
principal (i) in the form of prints, or (ii) in any other form which is reasonably
adapted to being .... disseminated or circulated among two or more persons shall,
not later than forty-eight hours after the beginning of the transmittal thereof, file
with the Attorney General two copies thereof and a statement, duly signed by or on
behalf of such agent, setting forth full information as the places, times, and extent of
such transmittal.
Id.
4. 22 U.S.C.A. § 614(b) (West 1979) provides in part:
It shall be unlawful for any person within the United States who is an agent of a
foreign principal ... to transmit ... any political propaganda ... unless such polit-
ical propaganda is conspicuously marked at its beginning with, or prefaced or accom-
panied by, a true and accurate statement, in the language or languages used in such
political propaganda, setting forth the relationship or connection between the person
transmitting the political propaganda or causing it to be transmitted; that the person
transmitting such political propaganda or causing it to be transmitted is registered
under this subchapter with the Department of Justice, Washington, District of Co-
lumbia, as an agent of a foreign principal; that, as required by this subchapter, his
registration statement is available for inspection at and copies of such political propa-
ganda are being filed with the Department of Justice; and that registration of agents
of foreign principals required by the subchapter does not indicate approval by the
United States government of the contents of their political propaganda.
Id.
5. - U.S. -, 107 S. Ct. 1862 (1987).
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a disseminator of political propaganda.6 Believing that the government
was effectively censoring his speech, Keene brought this action challeng-
ing the constitutionality of FARA. If application of the label was found
to be unconstitutional, the films would not be required to carry the polit-
ical propaganda label and could be shown by Keene without risk to his
reputation.
Before reaching the substantive issue, the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of California first determined that Keene
had standing to challenge the constitutionality of FARA due to the risk
of damage to his reputation.7 The court also held that since Keene was
complaining of a species of censorship he must have standing.8 On the
substantive issue the court held that the use of the term political propa-
ganda, required by FARA, violated Keene's First Amendment right of
freedom of speech and was therefore unconstitutional. The court based
its conclusion on a cause and effect relationship. Because the public re-
gards the term political propaganda as synonymous with "officially cen-
sured," people like Keene are not afforded access to materials which have
been given the label political propaganda due to the risk to their reputa-
tion. Non-access is a form of abridged speech. Thus, Keene's First
6. [A] Gallup public opinion study designed and interpreted by Mervin Field as indi-
cating that a campaign charge of having exhibited films that the United States Justice
Department has officially classified as political propaganda would have a seriously
adverse effect on the electoral chances of a candidate for the California Legislature.
Brief for Appellee at 16, Meese v. Keene, 107 S. Ct. 1862 (1987).
7. It did so by adopting the reasoning of the Court in Keene v. Smith, 569 F. Supp. 1513
(E.D. Cal. 1983). The three requirements to establish standing are: 1) injury to plaintiff; 2) the
injury must be fairly traceable to the defendant; and 3) the injury must be susceptible to judi-
cial remedy.
The first requirement was met because:
[t]here can be little doubt that a film exhibitor, especially in a non-commercial con-
text, is likely and reasonably to be understood as using the film to communicate the
exhibitor's own ideas. Thus, a statute which inhibits the exhibitor's ability to exhibit
also impinges on the exhibitor's ability to communicate. It is this special impairment
on the plaintiff's ability to communicate which constitutes an injury different in kind
from that suffered by the public in general.
Keene, 569 F. Supp. at 1518.
The second requirement was also met because "the Act [FARA] characterizes the films
that plaintiff wants to exhibit as political propaganda; that such a characterization necessarily
denigrates the content of the films and vilifies plaintiff and as a result of such vilification clients
and constituents will peremptorily reject the ideas that plaintiff hopes to communicate." Id.
Third, "an injunction directed to these defendants will provide plaintiff with the desired
relief." Id.
8. Keene v. Meese, 619 F. Supp. 1111 (E.D. Cal. 1985). "Censorship . . . consists of
present governmental interference with or suppression of expression. Censorship is a regula-
tory, proscriptive, or compulsory exercise of governmental power, and it is patently absurd to
suggest that one whose expression has been censored by the government lacks standing to
complain of that censorship." Id. at 1118.
1988]
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Amendment right was violated.9
On direct appeal, 1° the Supreme Court agreed that Keene had
standing to challenge the constitutionality of FARA since cognizable in-
jury would result to Keene's reputation if he disseminated the films with
the political propaganda label." However, the Supreme Court held that
the DOJ's use of the term political propaganda, and therefore FARA,
was constitutional.
The Supreme Court's holding was based on the legislative definition
of the term political propaganda as used in FARA. FARA defines polit-
ical propaganda to include both misleading advocacy in the popular, pe-
jorative sense and materials that are completely accurate.' 2 The Court
held that the use of the term political propaganda was neutral and there-
fore constitutionally permissible.' 3
The Court further reasoned that FARA places no burden on the
First Amendment right of freedom of speech since it does not prohibit or
restrain Keene from distributing the film. Apparently, the Supreme
Court applied a "prior restraint" test of First Amendment constitutional-
ity to this case. Since a "prior restraint" requires the prohibition of dis-
semination and since the government had not prohibited Keene from
distributing the films, the Court concluded that there was no First
Amendment violation. To the contrary, the Court held that FARA ac-
tually fosters freedom of speech by providing for disclosures which help
9. Id. at 1124-26.
10. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1253 (West 1979) provides:
Except as otherwise provided by law, any party may appeal to the Supreme Court
from an order granting or denying, after notice and hearing, an interlocutory or per-
manent injunction in any civil action, suit or proceeding required by any Act of
Congress to be heard and determined by a district court of three judges.
Id.
11. Meese v. Keene, 107 S. Ct. 1862, 1866-69 (1987).
12. The statutory definition of the term political propaganda is contained in 22 U.S.C.A.
§ 6110) (West 1979) and reads in relevant part:
The term "political propaganda" includes any oral, visual, graphic, written, pictorial,
or other communication or expression by any person (1) which is reasonably adapted
to, or which person disseminating the same believes will, or which he intends to,
prevail upon, indoctrinate, convert, induce, or in any other way influence a recipient
or any section of the public within the United States with reference to the political or
public interests, policies, or relations of a government of a foreign country or a for-
eign political party or with reference to the foreign policies of the United States or
promote in the United States racial, religious, or social dissensions, or (2) which
advocates, advises, instigates, or promotes any racial, social, political or religious
disorder, civil riot, or other conflict involving the use of force or violence in any other
American republic or the overthrow of any government or political subdivision of
any other American republic by any means involving the use of force or violence.
Id.
13. Meese, 107 S. Ct. at 1873 (1987).
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the public in evaluating the content of the films. 4 Hence, the use of the
term political propaganda could not be unconstitutional.
FARA WAS INAPPLICABLE TO THIS CASE
Interestingly, the Supreme Court did not need to decide the consti-
tutionality of FARA because FARA could have been deemed to be inap-
plicable to this case. As noted above, FARA requires that the film be
disseminated by or on behalf of a foreign principal. Therefore, in order
for FARA to be applicable to the films they must be shown by or on
behalf of the Canadian government. It was nowhere contended nor
proved that Keene disseminated the films on behalf of the Canadian gov-
ernment. Furthermore, Keene was not an agent of a foreign principal
within the definition of FARA. FARA defines an agent of a foreign
principal as any person who acts on behalf of or under the direction of a
foreign principal.' 5 Keene, as mentioned above, is a State Senator. It
was never contended nor proved that he had any ties to the Canadian
government. It does not appear that he was showing the films under the
direction of or on behalf of the Canadian government. Thus, FARA may
have been deemed inapplicable in this case. However, because this case-
note is an analysis of the Supreme Court's holding, it will hereafter be
assumed that FARA was applicable.
THE TERM PROPAGANDA IS COMMONLY UNDERSTOOD
IN ITS PEJORATIVE SENSE
Although the Supreme Court may not have been incorrect in stating
that the term propaganda could be defined neutrally, its definition was
certainly incomplete. Substantial evidence indicates that the term propa-
ganda is more commonly understood in its pejorative sense. In this case,
the pejorative sense of that term is demonstrated by the fact that it will
deter some people from seeing the films, and others who do see the films
14. "Congress simply required the disseminators of such material to make additional dis-
closures that would better enable the public to evaluate the import of the propaganda." Id. at
1871.
15. The statutory definition of "agents of a foreign principal" is contained in 22 U.S.C.A.
§ 61 l(c)(1) (West 1979) and reads in relevant part:
[A]ny person who acts as an agent, representative, employee, or servant, or any per-
son who acts in any other capacity at the order, request or under the direction, or
control of a foreign principal or of a person any of whose activities are directly or
indirectly supervised, directed, controlled, financed, or subsidized in whole or in ma-
jor part by a foreign principal, and who directly or through any other person-(i)
engages within the United States in political activities for or in the interests of such
foreign principal.
1988]
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will be highly skeptical of their content.' 6
Evidence which demonstrates that the term propaganda is under-
stood in its pejorative sense is abundant. "[T]he name propaganda is
applied in modem political language as a term of reproach to secret as-
sociations for the spread of opinions and principles which is viewed by
most governments with horror and aversion."' 7 If the term is regarded
by the government with "horror and aversion"'" then certainly when the
government labels a film with that term its message to the public is that
the film should be ignored and if not ignored at least highly scrutinized.
Webster's defines propaganda as "any systematic, widespread dis-
semination or promotion of particular ideas, doctrines, practices, etc. to
further ones own cause or to damage an opposing one; ideas, doctrines,
or allegations so spread: now often used disparagingly to connote decep-
tion or distortion. "'" Information which is perceived as distorted or de-
ceptive is certainly going to be ignored by the public.
Furthermore, even the legislative definition of the term propaganda
cannot be labeled neutral. It is difficult to understand how a word which
is defined as advocating racial, social, or political disorder is neutral.2"
Furthermore, the intent of Congress in enacting FARA was not to en-
able the government to express its views on the information being dis-
seminated, 2' but rather to solve the problem of rapidly spreading Nazi
propaganda in the 1930's. Congress, since it could not suppress this in-
formation, dealt with this problem via the next best thing-compelled
speech.
16. Brief for Amici Curiae at 11, Meese, 107 S. Ct. 1862 (1987).
17. OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 1466 (1971), quoted in Keene v. Meese, 619 F. Supp.
1111, 1125 (E.D. Cal. 1985).
18. Because Congress enacted this statute it is evident that it has a strong aversion to the
propaganda of other nations.
19. WEBSTER'S, NEW WORLD DICTIONARY OF THE AMERICAN LANGUAGE, 1188 (1972)
(emphasis added).
20. It may be that "the definition of the phrase political propaganda contained in FARA
partakes neither of the usual, negative, sense of the words nor of any of the possible dictionary
meanings." Keene v. Meese, 619 F. Supp. 1111, 1122 (E.D. Cal. 1985).
21. [T]his case no more involves an "expression of views" than the Pure Food and
Drug Act is the mere expression by Congress that dangerous drugs and impure foods
are a menace to public health. Like the latter Act, the FARA was enacted to solve a
problem Congress had identified .... As the record demonstrates, FARA was en-
acted to suppress pernicious doctrine; Congress chose as its method the classification
and labeling scheme at issue here.
Brief for Appellee at 32-33, Meese v. Keene, 107 S. Ct. 1862 (1987).
[Vol. 8
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
THE POLITICAL PROPAGANDA LABEL AS REQUIRED BY FARA
CONSTITUTES COMPELLED SPEECH AND IS THEREFORE
UNCONSTITUTIONAL
As discussed above, the DOJ has the power to label as political
propaganda any publication or film of a foreign principal. The central
issue in Meese was whether the DOJ was constitutionally permitted to
label the films "political propaganda." Encompassed in that issue was
whether the federal government has a right to review the films of foreign
agents and affix to them a label with which the disseminator of the film,
who may be an American, may disagree. In other words, may the federal
government compel speech?22 By failing to recognize this issue the Court
has, for the first time, established precedent which answers that question
in the affirmative.
Undoubtedly, the next question is whether the DOJ should have the
power to label these films propaganda, assuming they truly are. For two
reasons this concern is irrelevant. First, by requiring that this judgment
be made by the DOJ rather than by the viewers of the film it seems that
Congress has little, if any, confidence in the intellect of the American
public. Second, and more importantly, the fact that it may be propa-
ganda does not make it any less unconstitutional to allow the federal
government to compel speech. The disseminator of the film is still being
compelled to say that which he would not otherwise say. As the discus-
sion below illustrates, this is a violation of the First Amendment right to
free speech.
In 1943, the Court held that the First Amendment protection of
freedom of speech includes both the right to speak and the right to re-
frain from speaking. 3 In West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette,
2 4
the Court held the compulsory flag salute unconstitutional. It deter-
mined that "[t]o sustain the compulsory flag salute we are required to say
that a Bill of Rights which guards the individual's right to speak his own
22. Although this note only discusses the manner in which the government may not com-
pel speech, there are circumstances in which it may do just that. One example of such a
circumstance is the requirement that food and drugs be correctly labeled with the ingredients.
This type of compelled speech is distinguishable from the type involved here. Food and drugs
require labeling so that the public as consumers will be protected from harmful substances.
Most lay-persons are unable to tell what the ingredients in a particular product are. However,
the public has the intellect necessary to determine whether or not a particular piece of informa-
tion is propaganda. Furthermore, if this were a case where FARA was applicable and in-
volved a non-citizen foreign agent the government would be permitted to compel the
disseminators of the films to use the label.
23. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1942).
24. Id.
1988]
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mind, left it open to public authorities to compel him to utter what is not
in his mind."25 The Bill of Rights did not, of course, leave such a gap.
Keene, by showing these films, is speaking his mind. He is commu-
nicating a message with which he agrees. However, when the propa-
ganda label is affixed to these films he is compelled to utter not only what
is not in his mind but also something with which he disagrees.
The question of whether an individual must exhibit an idea with
which he disagrees is not new to the Supreme Court. In Wooley v. May-
nard,26 the Court held unconstitutional a state statute which required its
citizens to bear the state motto on their license plates. In so holding, the
Court stated that:
Here as in Barnette we are faced with a state measure which
forces an individual, as part of his daily life-indeed constantly
while his automobile is in public view-to be an instrument for
fostering public adherence to an ideological point of view he
finds unacceptable. In so doing, the State invades the sphere of
intellect and spirit which it is the purpose of the First Amend-
ment to our Constitution to reserve from all official control.27
Furthermore, when one espouses a point of view, not only is there no
obligation to express counter-arguments, but it would be unconstitu-
tional to require such expression. 8
As in Wooley, and notwithstanding the legislative definition of the
term propaganda, Keene is required to label his ideas with a term with
which he disagrees. Aside from the injury to his reputation, Keene will
be required, in essence, to express counter-arguments. As indicated
25. Id. at 634.
26. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
27. Id. at 715.
28. The Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974). In Miami Herald
Publishing Co., Florida's "right to reply" statute was challenged. The statute required all
publications which published commentary against a political candidate, to give that candidate
the right to reply in that publication. The Supreme Court, in a unanimous decision, held that
the statute violated the First Amendment guarantee of a free press. It held that the content of
a newspaper was to be left to the discretion of its editors and that "[tihe power of a privately
owned newspaper to advance its own political, social, and economic views is bounded by only
two factors: first, the acceptance of a sufficient number of readers-and hence advertisers-to
assure financial success; and, second, the journalistic integrity of its editors and publishers."
Id. at 739. See also Pacific Gas and Elec. Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1
(1986), where the Supreme Court held that the California Public Utilities Commission could
not require a privately owned utility company to include in its billing envelopes speech of a
third party with which the utility disagreed. "Just as the state is not free to tell a newspaper in
advance what it can print and what it cannot ... the state is not free either to restrict appel-
lant's speech to certain topics or views or to force appellant to respond to views that others
may hold." Id. at 7.
[Vol. 8
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above, this violates established precedent.29
It may be true that Keene does not have to express such counter-
arguments because he can remove the label affixed to the films by the
DOJ. However:
[i]t is not a matter of simply peeling a pasted label off the sur-
face of a book. The regulations require the label to be "made a
part of the film" . . . Appellee [Keene] is not a commercial or
professional film exhibitor, and there is no reason to assume
that removing a label that has been made a part of the film is
something he can do without any effort, expense, or delay."
Although Keene could take the labels off and take the appropriate steps
to make sure the public does not regard him as the disseminator of polit-
ical propaganda it will take considerable time and expense. Because such
time and expense will be incurred he may be dissuaded from showing
them. Again his speech will have been abridged and the First Amend-
ment violated. This very proposition was expounded by the Supreme
Court in Federal Election Commission v. Massachussetts Citizens For
Life, 31 where it was held that if a statute burdens one's freedom of speech
by requiring such expenditures it is unconstitutional.
In summary, the Supreme Court reached a conclusion contrary to
the law in this area. First, there is substantial evidence that the definition
of the term propaganda is pejorative. Second, the label propaganda con-
stitutes compelled speech and its use by the DOJ is therefore unconstitu-
tional. Furthermore, the government is regulating speech based on
29. The fact that the cases discussed in this casenote involved state rather than federal
statutes which compelled speech is not a factor which weakens the arguments made above.
Indeed, the fact that the states are not allowed to compel their citizens to convey ideas which
they do not believe in is even more reason to restrict the federal government from having the
power to do so.
30. Brief for Appellee at 12, Meese v. Keene, 107 S. Ct. 1862 (1987).
31. Federal Election Comm'n v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, - U.S. -, 107 S. Ct.
616 (1986). In this case § 316 of the Federal Election Campaign Act, 2 U.S.C. § 441(b) (1983)
was challenged. That section prohibited corporations from using treasury funds to make an
expenditure in connection with any election. In holding § 441 unconstitutional, the Court
stated:
It is not unreasonable to suppose that, as in this case, an incorporated group of like-
minded persons might seek donations to support the dissemination of their political
ideas, and their occasional endorsement of political candidates, by means of garage
sales, bake sales, and raffles. Such persons might well be turned away by the prospect
of complying with all the requirements imposed by the Act. Faced with the need to
assume more sophisticated organizational form, to adopt specific accounting proce-
dures, to file periodic detailed reports, and to monitor garage sales lest nonmembers
take a fancy to the merchandise on display, it would not be surprising if at least some
groups decided that the contemplated political activity was simply not worth it.
Federal Election Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. at 626.
1988]
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content. As will be demonstrated below, this type of content based regu-
lation is constitutionally impermissible.
THE FIRST AMENDMENT GUARDS AGAINST THIS TYPE OF CONTENT
BASED REGULATION
FARA requires the DOJ to determine whether the content of the
information sought to be disseminated is propaganda. Therefore, the
DOJ has the power to distinguish "propaganda" from "non-propa-
ganda" and to regulate the dissemination of foreign made films all on the
basis of their content. The First Amendment guards against this type of
content based regulation.
The case most often cited for the proposition that the government
cannot restrict speech on the basis of content is Police Dept. v. Mosley. 32
In Mosley, the Supreme Court held an ordinance unconstitutional be-
cause it made an impermissible distinction between labor picketing and
other types of peaceful picketing. The problem with the ordinance was
that it distinguished picketing on the basis of content. In so holding the
Court stated "the First Amendment means that government has no
power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject
matter, or its content."33 This is precisely what the DOJ has the power
to do pursuant to FARA. Foreign films are reviewed and scrutinized on
the basis of their message and subject matter.
The term propaganda selectively suppresses other points of view.34
The federal government's opinion is highly regarded by the American
public. Therefore, when it labels certain information as propaganda it is
virtually impossible for an individual advancing that information as his/
her own view to overcome that label. This would not be true if a more
neutral term was used.35 It is not the objective of this casenote to deny
that the government has a right or interest in advocating its view. Nor is
it being suggested that the government should not do so. It is simply
being argued that the term propaganda, used by the government in this
32. Police Dept. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
33. Id. at 95.
34. Necessarily, then, under the Equal Protection Clause, not to mention the First
Amendment itself, government may not grant the use of a forum to people whose
views it finds acceptable, but deny use to those wishing to express less favorable or
more controversial views. And it may not select which issues are worth discussing or
debating in public facilities.
Id. at 96.
35. If a more neutral term was used by the government the person(s) exhibiting the film
would be able to present his/her views without being shunned as the government's adversary.
Not only is this not a violation of the disseminator's First Amendment right but it enhances
the market place of ideas and free flow of information.
[Vol. 8
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context, weighs heavily on the public's mind and thereby selectively sup-
presses other points of view in violation of the First Amendment right to
free speech.
One remedy for this constitutional violation is to abandon the re-
quirement that the label appear with every showing of the film. The gov-
ernment could, for example, mail out pamphlets which indicate its point
of view regarding the film. Alternatively, it could publish periodicals
which discuss its views on particular films. In so doing the compelled
speech violation would be cured, as would the content-based regulation
problems. The government would then be expressing its view, not via
compelled speech, or any other constitutional violation, but by way of
the free market of ideas. Furthermore, a term more neutral than propa-
ganda should be used so that other points of view are not selectively
suppressed.
Although recently it appears that the Supreme Court is moving
away from its views expressed in Mosley, a close reading of subsequent
opinions reveals that this is not the case. The case most often cited to
support the proposition that the Court no longer adheres to the broad
definition of content neutrality laid out in Mosely is Young v. American
Mini Theaters.36 However, Young has neither explicitly nor implicitly
overruled Mosely. Young does nothing more than uphold an ordinance
which restricts the location of adult theaters. Although this restriction
was based on the content of the films shown in these theaters there was
no restriction placed on their exhibition.
For two reasons this decision does not affect the holding of Mosely.
First, the decision in Young is based on three important qualifications.
Those qualifications are: (1) protection of pornography is a less vital in-
terest than protection of the free dissemination of ideas of social and
political significance; (2) the particular ordinance was susceptible to a
narrow construction; and (3) although adult films had to be exhibited in
commercially licensed theaters, that was true of all motion pictures.37
Second, although the ordinance depended on the content of the
communication this did not:
contradict the underlying reason for the rule which is generally
described as a prohibition of regulation based on the content of
protected communication. The essence of that rule is the need
for absolute neutrality by the government; its regulation of
communication may not be effected by sympathy or hostility
36. Young v. American Mini Theaters, 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
37. Id. at 61.
1988]
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for the point of view being expressed by the communicator."8
Thus, the most favorable interpretation of this case would allow the DOJ
to look at the content of a foreign film to determine its origin and to
require the disseminator to reveal such information as the place it was
made and on whose behalf it is being shown but not to label the film
propaganda. Similarly, under Young, it may not label the film with a
favorable term. It must remain absolutely neutral as to the film's
content.
Commentators have argued that "the principle of content neutrality
is too broad and inflexible to achieve sensitive accommodations among
[other] competing interests." 39 Those competing interests include the
right to "privacy and community." There is no doubt about the fact that
what some people consider appropriate speech, others will find unaccept-
able or even repulsive. That, however, is simply one of the ramifications
of freedom of speech. Furthermore, it is a necessary evil, for it is virtu-
ally impossible to eliminate only speech which we all find offensive.
What is offensive to some is not so to others.
Furthermore, there are a series of questions which must be dealt
with before freedom of speech can be abridged to exclude the offensive
material. First, who decides whether the speech is offensive? A majority,
minority, or plurality? How will it be decided? By vote or some sort of
legislative body? How offensive must it be to deserve eradication?
Where is the line between offensive and artistic? Who will decide where
that line is? More specifically, should rape or child molestation cases not
be televised or talked about because they are offensive? Since there is
virtually no end to this line of questioning caution should be taken when
placing limits on speech based on its content.
Another consequence of freedom of speech bears mention. If there
is speech with which we disagree we will simply not listen to it, or having
listened to it we will disregard it. The conclusion, therefore, is that peo-
ple have the freedom to decide for themselves what to listen to and what
to believe, or what they find offensive and what they find to be propa-
ganda and not worthy of belief. The freedom and authority to make that
decision should not be readily delegated.
THE LABELING REQUIREMENT CONSTITUTES CENSORSHIP
It has been argued that "the principle [content neutrality], if taken
38. Id. at 67.
39. Note, Content Regulation and the Dimensions of Free Expression, 96 HARv.L.REv.
1854, 1858 (1983).
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literally, would preclude legal restriction of defamation, incitement, inva-
sion of privacy, false advertising, and other types of expression that are
currently subject to content based regulation."4 However, as long ago
as 1931 the Supreme Court explained the distinction between prior re-
straints (i.e. censorship) and subsequent punishment as it pertained to
freedom of the press and generally to all of the First Amendment
freedoms.
In Near v. Minnesota,4" plaintiff brought an action challenging the
constitutionality of a Minnesota statute which required plaintiff to get
the approval of the courts before publishing criticisms of local officials.
The Supreme Court held that the statute imposed an unconstitutional
restraint upon publication stating that "the main purpose of such consti-
tutional provisions [First Amendment] is to prevent all such previous
restraints upon publications ... and they do not prevent the subsequent
punishment of such as may be deemed contrary to the public welfare."42
Therefore, the concern about legal restrictions on improper publications
misses the point.
Before proceeding any further, it should be noted that the fact that a
"prior restraint" has traditionally meant a complete ban on the informa-
tion to be disseminated is of no consequence. The label propaganda has
the same effect as a ban. Because of the label, the disseminator will not
show the films for fear that his/her reputation will be effected. It is true
that the government here did not ban Keene from showing the films, but
by labeling them propaganda they effectively accomplished the same
purpose.
The propaganda label is a previous restraint placed by the DOJ on
publication. Before anyone is allowed to disseminate a foreign film the
DOJ will have reviewed and labeled it based on its content. If the label is
"propaganda," the DOJ will have successfully placed a prior restraint on
the film.
Let us suppose that a "propaganda" label was not placed upon a
foreign film, the exhibition of which created riots due to false or incom-
plete information. Obviously, the disseminator of the film would not be
allowed to escape punishment. The definite threat of punishment alone is
enough to deter most people from disseminating meritless information.
Undoubtedly, there will be those who will not be deterred by the threat
of punishment. However, the freedom of speech granted to the majority
should not be restricted due to its misuse by a minority.
40. Id. at 1858.
41. Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697 (1930).
42. Id. at 714.
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DOES THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT HAVE A COMPELLING REASON
FOR MAINTAINING THE "PROPAGANDA" LABEL?
If the government has a compelling reason for maintaining the label
propaganda it must be permitted to do so. The reasons for the label may
be ascertained from the intent of Congress in enacting the statute.
In the 1930's there was tremendous concern about propaganda on
behalf of Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union carried out in the United
States. A special committee, generally known as the House Un-Ameri-
can Activities Committee ("HUAC"), was formed to investigate:
"(1) the extent, character, and object of Nazi propaganda activities in the
United States; (2) the dissemination within the United States of subver-
sive propaganda controlled by foreign countries, attacking the American
form of government, and (3) all other questions in relation thereto that
would aid Congress in any necessary remedial legislation. '4 3 One
counter-measure for dealing with the propaganda was FARA. In other
words, by labeling the information disseminated by these groups as prop-
aganda Congress knew that the American public would ignore it. That
is precisely why its application to a case such as Keene is unconstitu-
tional. Congress has a legitimate purpose and right to protect the demo-
cratic process by counteracting the propaganda of other nations
regarding their own political systems. Congress, however, should not
have the right to curb the speech of American citizens who are in no way
connected or acting on behalf of a foreign power.
As stated above, this does not imply that Congress has no right to
express its views regarding the films. It is only being suggested that the
use of FARA in this case was not only unnecessary but inappropriate.
To the extent that Congress wishes to inform the public that it does not
agree with the content of the film it has a right to do so, like any other
entity. It should not, however, have the right to compel the disseminator
of the films to say that which he/she would not otherwise say or to apply
content based censorship to avoid the dissemination of the information.
Because the government does not have a sufficient interest to over-
come the constitutional violations, FARA must be unconstitutional.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, it must be stressed that FARA is not unconstitutional
when it is applied to agents of a foreign principal who are not American
citizens. The problem arises only when FARA is applied to cases which
43. H.R. RES. 198, 73RD CONG., 2D SESS., 78 CONG. REC. 13 (1934), quoted in Brief for
Appellee at 33, Meese v. Keene, 107 S. Ct. 1862 (1987).
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involve American citizens who are not agents of a foreign principal and
who are merely espousing their own points of view through a foreign
film. When applied to the latter group FARA is a violation of the First
Amendment because it is a form of censorship and because it compels
speech.
Sohaila Sagheb

